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Using the multicointegration methodology first presented in Granger and Lee (1989, 1990) and further
developed by Engsted, Gonzalo and Haldrup (1997) and Haldrup (1998) we develop criteria for testing
sustainability of the fiscal budgeting process. We then apply this criteria to the fiscal systems of fifteen
industrialized  countries.  Finland,  Norway,  the  U.K.  and  Switzerland  display  government  budgeting
behavior consistent with sustainable fiscal practices. Evidence indicates that the budgeting practices of
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.S.
are inconsistent with practices that are sustainable. The findings suggest that over the sample period the
governments of these last eleven countries may have been trying to exploit low rates of interest relative to
growth or execute a Ponzi scheme. However, should growth decline, sustainability of the fiscal processes
may  become  problematic  necessitating  structural  adjustments.  The  evidence  further  suggests  that
reforming  budgetary  institutions  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  them  stronger,  more  hierarchical  and
transparent will mitigate the pressures to pursue fiscal profligacy. Multicointegration, Sustainability of Fiscal Practices and the Role of Fiscal Institutions
Section 1: Introduction
Although fiscal balance sheets have recently improved in many industrialized countries, over the
last four decades deficits have been the norm for many countries. This experience has heightened the issue
of budgetary management. In addition, recent  work  by  Bohn  (1995,  1998)  and  Ball,  Elmendorf  and
Mankiw (1998) has lead researchers to rethink the issue of systematic deficits and the burden associated
with debt accumulation. Specifically, these authors have shown that persistent deficits and accumulation of
debt does not necessarily imply that fiscal processes are unsustainable. The implication of this work is that
the  standard  approach  to  testing  whether  government  adheres  to  its  intertemporal  budget  constraint,
cointegration analysis, does not provide sufficient criteria for determining whether the fiscal process is truly
sustainable. Consequently, in this paper we develop a more explicit set of criteria under more realistic
assumptions for determining whether a country exhibits a sustainable budgeting process.
We then apply these criteria to the budgeting practices of fifteen industrialized countries: Belgium,
Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Great  Britain  (U.K.),  Greece,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States (U.S.).  We rank the countries according to
their performance with respect to our criteria and relate our findings to the politico-institutional theory of
budgetary  management  that  suggests  that  certain  structures  of  budgetary  institutions  promote  fiscal
restraint. Recent work by Poterba and von Hagen (1999) concludes that fiscal budgeting institutions affect
fiscal policy outcomes. However, the empirical evidence for this proposition is weak [see e.g. von Hagen
(1992) and de Haan, Moessen and Volernik (1999)]. Therefore, using results from multicointegration tests
of government spending and revenues we also examine the relationship between fiscal institutions and
budgeting performance.
To accomplish our tasks we draw on traditional cointegration analysis and the multicointegrationapproach first presented by Granger and Lee (1989, 1990) and further developed in Engsted, Gonzalo and
Haldrup (1997) and Haldrup (1998). We then apply logit analysis to test for the statistical significance of
institutions of budgetary management as determinants of fiscal outcomes. Our sample spans the modern
era, 1960-1998, because 1960 “seemed to be a watershed, and the growth in public spending after that
year was quite dramatic” (Tanzi and Schuknecht,1997: 165) due to a variety of intellectual and political
pressures.
We extend the intertemporal budgeting literature by using the multicointegration framework to
develop a richer set of criteria for budgeting sustainability. This criteria assesses both the stock and flow
relationships  that  should  characterize  sustainable  fiscal  processes  when  the  data  are  non-stationary.
Cointegration between the spending-revenue flow relationship is the first step. Cointegration between the
flow of revenue (spending) and the stock of debt is the second step. Jointly these conditions characterize
multicointegration  between  government  spending  and  revenue.  Multicointegration  can  ensure  that  a
country’s budgeting strategy is sustainable in “bad” states of nature; that is, when the rate of economic
growth falls short of the real interest rate on sovereign debt.
Multicointegration implies that in a bivariate I(1) system more than one cointegrating vector may
exist such that the number of cointegrating vectors and the number of stochastic trends do not add up to the
dimensions of the system as is the case with cointegrated I(1) models. This allows for a special case of
polynomial cointegration which captures both flow and stock relations [see e.g. Granger and Lee (1989)
and Engsted and Haldrup (1999)]. The presence of such a relationship indicates that the bivariate system is
bound together by two equilibrating forces rather than the more traditional single equilibrium relationship
that  characterizes  conventionally  cointegrated  systems.  In  the  multicointegration  case,  the  system  is
characterized by a complex stock-flow equilibrium relationship that is not uncommon in intertemporal
models of economic behavior. Such a relationship is typically associated with issues of optimal controlwhere the levels and rates of change of the variables comprising the system are determinants of the policy
response. In terms of our system of fiscal variables, this relationship reflects the government’s policy
response mechanism to the accumulation of public debt.
Bohn (1995) and Ball, et. al. (1998) point out that existing theoretical models which underpin the
traditional sustainability tests are too simple. Specifically, Bohn (1995) shows that the sustainability of
imbalances  in  a  stochastic  setting  involves  satisfying  an  intertemporal  budget  constraint  and  a
transversality condition that differs from that implicit in simple (deterministic) models. The transversality
condition requires that the limit of the debt discounted at a rate that is a function of the probability
distribution of future debt and the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption
be zero. This correct discounting is critical in economies where the rate of growth has been higher than the
real interest rate. Such  an  economy  can  sustain  persistent  deficits  as  high  rates  of  economic  growth
diminish the burden of debt. Thus Ponzi schemes become Ponzi gambles which are “undesirable for some
generations in some realizations of history (when growth falls below the real interest rate), but desirable for
all generations in most realizations of history” (Ball, et al., 1998: 701).
The multicointegration framework will assess whether the policy  response  accommodates  the
undesirable scenario. Thus, what we are empirically testing is whether the behavior that each country
exhibits over the sample period is consistent with sustainable budgeting policies regardless of economic
performance. We also shed light on the more general nature of each country’s fiscal process. Should a
country exhibit budgeting practices that are not sustainable, we would expect that a future policy shift
might be necessary. These policy shifts would alter the distribution of debt in future states of nature.
Optimally policy changes would take the form of tax and spending changes that bring revenues in line with
spending  and  debt  commitments  and/or  institutional  reforms.  Section  6  sheds  light  on  the  impact  of
budgetary institutional reform as a means of promoting fiscal restraint. However, a government could,inflate away its debt or default. This would simply be another form of taxation. Since we know of no
exogenous factors that might allow us to predict the exact nature of these future changes we acknowledge
this as a caveat to our research.
Results indicate that the budgeting practices of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.S are inconsistent with our sustainability criteria. For
these eleven countries the evidence suggests that their governments have undertaken a Ponzi scheme or
engaged in a deliberate attempt to exploit low interest rates relative to growth. Should economic growth
slow,  the  debt  burden  may  become  problematic  necessitating  significant  structural  adjustments.  Our
findings indicate that adopting strong, transparent budgetary institutions will contribute to better fiscal
policy design. In the economies of Finland, Norway, Switzerland and the U.K. the evidence is consistent
with  cointegration  or  multicointegration  between  government  spending  and  revenues.  All  coefficient
estimates exhibit sign and magnitude that suggests that the governments of these four countries have
adopted fiscal policy designs that satisfy sustainability criteria.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  reviews  the  literature  on
intertemporal  budgeting,  sustainability  of  deficits  and  political-economic  theories  of  budget  deficits.
Section 3 outlines the model and derives the theoretical constructs to be tested. Section 4 presents the
multicointegration methodology. In Section 5 the multicointegration results are presented and discussed.
The penultimate section investigates the role that budgeting institutions play in fiscal performance. Section
7 concludes.
Section 2:  Background
Many researchers have explored the issue of solvency and Ponzi financing in a deterministic
setting. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) were among the first to adopt the intertemporal budget constraint
approach to empirically investigate the issue. They examine the 1962-1984 period for the U.S. concludingthat the data supports a binding constraint. Wilcox (1987) and Kremers (1989) extend the work in this
area contradicting the Hamilton and Flavin conclusion that the data is consistent with an intertemporal
budget constraint.
 Using the cointegration approach, studies by Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1990), Smith and Zin
(1988),  Hakkio  and  Rush  (1991),  Haug  (1991),  Ahmed  and  Rogers  (1995),  and  Leachman  (1996)
produce conflicting evidence surrounding the issue of government’s use of Ponzi financing. Trehan and
Walsh and Haug find evidence supporting solvency and intertemporal fiscal balance for the U.S. On the
other hand, Hakkio and Rush and Leachman produce evidence that is inconsistent with intertemporal
solvency and a binding American budget constraint. Smith and Zin explore the intertemporal fiscal balance
of Canada, producing evidence that supports a sustainable fiscal path over the long run. Finally, the work
of Ahmed and Rogers inspects the fiscal balance of both the U.S. and Great Britain over quite lengthy
sample  periods.  They  conclude  that  the  evidence  is  consistent  with  both  countries  obeying  their
intertemporal budget constraints.
With the exception of Ahmed and Rogers’ (1995) work, all of the models that underpin the work
cited above are derived in a deterministic setting, generally under the  assumption  that  economies  are
dynamically efficient and the rate of growth is less than the safe interest rate.
1 More realistically the
environment is stochastic and uncertainty is present. In such a setting, sustainability of fiscal deficits is
typically more complex. Bohn (1995) develops the theoretical considerations for this scenario while Ahmed
and Rogers demonstrate that under certain conditions cointegration remains a sufficient condition. Ball,
et.al. (1998) further explore the issue of sustainability. They produce evidence for the U.S. indicating that
the probability of a bad outcome, defined as rates of growth below the real interest rate, is between ten and
twenty percent. Bohn (1998) outlines and tests for a corrective mechanism in the budgeting process that
                                                
1 See Ball, et al. (1998) and Bohn (1999) for conditions in which persistent deficits can be welfareenables an economy to sustain imbalances given bad outcomes. He finds that the U.S. exhibits such a
budgeting strategy.
Von Hagen and Harden (1994), Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1995, 1996) and Uctum and Wickens
(1996) also explore the sustainability issue. These studies look at the fiscal processes of an array of
countries and factors that influence a country’s ability to sustain persistent imbalances. Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin focus on factors that influence sustainability (through the promotion of growth) and directly affect
the willingness to pay for debt in a number of developing countries. Von Hagen and Harden and Uctum
and Wickens inspect the sustainability of the actual fiscal practices of the U.S. and a variety of European
countries.  Von  Hagen  and  Harden  conclude  that  France,  Germany,  the  U.K.,  Luxembourg  and  the
Netherlands exhibit fiscal practices that are “close” to sustainable for the entire sample period (1970-
1984). Denmark, Belgium and Ireland start the sample period with unsustainable processes but improve
their performance in the 1980s. Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal exhibit unsustainable practices. The
empirical evidence produced by Uctum and Wickens indicates that the fiscal stance of Denmark, the
Netherlands and Ireland is sustainable while the fiscal policy path exhibited by the U.S., Spain, Italy,
Belgium and Portugal is not.
The political economy literature is replete with theories explaining the different approaches to
budgeting and implicitly or explicitly offering explanations for systematic deficits. A number of theories
are only tangentially relevant implying that budgeting processes should be quite similar across countries,
especially over the course of the business and/or political cycle. The remainder investigate characteristics
of populations which might affect the demand for fiscal deficits or characteristics of governments and
institutions which might affect the supply of fiscal (ir)responsibility and determine the actual design of the
                                                                                                                                                  
improving in dynamically efficient economies.fiscal budgeting process.
2 From this vast literature our focus is on the structure of budgetary institutions as
determinants of fiscal outcomes. As Olson (1996), Keefer and Knack (1997), and Wagner (1997) among
others note, economic outcomes do not emerge in a vacuum. They are influenced by a complex array of
factors, one of which is the institutional framework within which the outcomes are generated. Hall and
Taylor (1996) point out that these institutions affect expectations and provide “a template for interpretation
or action” (p.939).
Von Hagen (1992), Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein (1995), Hahm, Kamlet and Mowery
(1996), Alesina and Perotti (1996a,b) de Haan, Moessen and Volernik (1999), Eichengreen, Hausmann
and von Hagen (1999), Poterba and von Hagen (1999) and Alt, Lassen and Skilling (2001) propose that
budgetary institutions affect fiscal policy outcomes. They point out that budgetary institutions tend to be
rather stable over time and that certain structures are more conducive to promoting sustainable budgeting
practices and fostering budget balance. Specifically, transparency in the budget process, strength of the
                                                
2 Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) suggest that debt is an intra-societal, rather than an intergenerational, transfer. 
They argue that in the current generation rich parents are indifferent to debt since they compensate for changes
therein by altering bequests. Poor parents prefer deficits as ideally they would like to leave negative bequests. 
Indifference to debt among the former, combined with preferences for debt among the latter lead to a social
preference for larger deficits. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) argue that geographically based representative
governments tend to overspend because representatives over-estimate the benefits of public projects within their
districts relative to the nationally dispersed costs. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) argue that if the current government
does not like the spending choices of its opponents, it can increase the satisfaction of its constituency by issuing
debt  and  thereby  constraining  future  policy  options  (of  opponents).    The  theory  implies  that  the  greater  the
polarization between parties and the more frequent the government turnover, the larger government debt will be.
Roubini and Sachs (1988) highlight some of the same variables but offer a different explanation. They argue that
weaker governments, where weakness is indicated by a short average tenure of government and by the presence of
many political parties in the coalition, lead to problems of budgetary management and design. Persson (2001)
presents evidence that electoral rules and political regimes affect government spending. Finally, it has been argued
that Left governments tend, because of their greater willingness to use state intervention and Keynesian policies, to
run larger deficits.  Thus, countries with many years of government by parties of the Left would be expected to
exhibit less adherence to the intertemporal budget constraint [see e.g. Garrett (1995)]. Similarly, rational partisan
theories of macroeconomics [see e.g. Carlsen (1998)] argue that Left governments are particularly adverse to
unemployment and as a consequence much more likely to stimulate aggregate demand and run deficits. On the
other hand, Aghion and Bolton (1990) argue that Right governments might choose to issue more debt than Left
governments in order to make a larger portion of the population debt holders. Such a strategy supposedly increases
support for the Right since the Left is perceived as more likely to default.fiscal bureaucracy and a “top-down” approach are the keys. The top-down approach limits universalism
and reciprocity not unlike the effects of fiscal bureaucratic strength. Transparency reduces government’s
ability to engage in creative accounting and illuminates, as much as possible, present and  future  tax
burdens thereby constraining budget choices and fiscal practices and promoting expectations which are less
biased with respect to budgeting issues.
Section 3: The Model
In this section we seek to build on the work of Bohn (1995, 1998) and Ahmed and Rogers (1995)
to develop a set of criteria by which government budgeting processes can be considered sustainable in all
states of nature. In Section 5 we will apply the criteria in order to rank the fiscal performances of our
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t+N Xt+N] [see e.g. Duffie (1996) for discussion].  To derive the relationships
relevant to this paper, we begin with the government’s budget constraint.  It is expressed as
Gt + (1+it-1) Bt-1 = Rt + Bt ,                         (1)
where G = government spending which includes purchases of goods and services as well as transfers, i = a
stationary safe rate of interest, B = government bonds of one period maturity and R = total government
revenue comprised primarily of taxes.  Simplifying and rearranging equation (1) produces
    (Gt + iBt-1) – Rt = Bt - Bt-1 = DBt ,                                       (1’)
where D is the first difference operator.
Substituting forward for Bt in equation (1) and rearranging, we obtain the following present value
relationship:
(1+it-1)Bt-1  =  Et S
¥
N=0 M t
t+N [Rt+N – Gt+N ]  +  limNÞ¥ Et [M t
t+N Bt+N ] . (2)Equation (2) simply says that the current value of government debt is equal to the expected present value of
all future primary surpluses, plus a limiting term representing the asymptotic expected present value of the
government’s debt.  We can ensure that the limiting term on the right hand side of (2) is nonnegative by
assuming that the government does not allow individuals to engage in Ponzi schemes against it.  Further, if
the government is satisfying its budget constraint intertemporally, it cannot asymptotically leave a debt
with positive expected present value.  Hence the time t expected paths of spending and revenues are
sustainable if the limiting term on the right hand side of (2) is equal to zero.
In a deterministic setting and/or one characterized by risk neutrality, the stochastic discount factor
is constant and equal to 1/(1+i), and the condition for sustainability reduces to limNÞ¥ [Bt+N / (1+i)
t+N ] = 0.
Assuming this environment and non-stationary data, this restriction has been empirically interpreted as
requiring a cointegrating relationship between spending and revenues with a coefficient of cointegration
less than or equal to one.  The reasoning behind such tests is typically based on ruling out a deterministic
bubble in government debt.  However, in a stochastic environmnent, Bohn (1995) has demonstrated that
even if government debt is riskless and pays a constant rate of return i, limNÞ¥ [Bt+N /(1+i)
t+N ] = 0  does
not necessarily imply that  limNÞ¥ Et [M t
t+N Bt+N ] = 0.  The problem here is that the correct discount factor
is a function of state contingent claim prices that can become arbitrarily large in bad (low GNP) states. 
Even if government debt grows at a rate smaller (larger) than i, the risk of a sharp decrease (increase) in
GNP can still cause the limiting term to be infinite (zero).
Fortunately, Ahmed and Rogers (1995) show that under relatively general conditions tests of
cointegration are still appropriate.  We will briefly review their results.  Taking the first difference of
equation (2) and substituting for DBt from (1’) yields
(Gt + it-1Bt-1 – Rt)   =   DEt S
¥
N=1 M t
t+N [Rt+N – Gt+N ]  
+  limNÞ¥ Et [M t
t+N Bt+N ] – limNÞ¥ Et-1 [M t-1
t+N-1 Bt+N-1 ] . (3)The authors assume that Gt, Rt, and Bt are I(1) processes with the following representations
3:
DGt+N  =  aG  +  nG, t+N , (4)
DRt+N  =  aR  +  nR, t+N , (5)
Bt  =  m  +  Bt-1 + f
t + ut . (6)
They show that under certain conditions on the stochastic discount factor and the risk premia on
government revenue and spending, limNÞ¥ Et [M t
t+N Bt+N ] = 0 holds if and only if the vector process (Rt,
Gt, it-1Bt-1) is cointegrated with the cointegrating vector (1, -1, -1).  The reasoning is simple: the
assumptions guarantee that  DEt S
¥
N=1 M t
t+N [Rt+N – Gt+N] is an I(0) process, so if both limit terms on the
right hand side are zero, Gt + it-1Bt-1 – Rt must be I(0) as well.
Many papers, including ours, use cointegration-based analysis to investigate the sustainability of
budgeting processes.  It is important to understand what this analysis does and does not say about the
temporal behavior of the government budget deficit.  Sustainability requires that the budget deficit be
stationary, i.e. in the long run, revenues and spending will tend to drift together.  However, Ahmed and
Rogers (1995) point out that stationarity of the deficit does not necessarily imply that the national debt
must eventually be paid off.  Furthermore, sustainability as it is defined here is an asymptotic property:
even if revenue and spending are cointegrated, deficits and surpluses may grow arbitrarily large over short
time horizons.  This can prove costly, as large deficits can have adverse welfare impacts.  For example,
Ball, et.al. (1998) characterize budget deficits as Ponzi gambles, in which the government “bets” that
aggregate income will grow fast enough to make the debt-income ratio fall systematically over time.  An
important result is that the larger the debt-income ratio grows, the less certain such a Ponzi gamble is to
succeed. 
                                                
3 Here aG, aR, m, and f are real constants, f has modulus less than unity, nG and nR are mean-zero stationary
processes, and ut is a stationary process with infinite MA representation ut = S
¥
N=0 yN et-N  in which {et} is white
noise and  S
¥
N=0 N|yN| < ¥.  For the cointegrating relationship, Ahmed and Rogers require that the risk premia onWe  will  therefore  develop  a  second  criterion.    Suppose  that  the  vector  process  (xt,  yt)  is
cointegrated. Specifically, let xt and yt be I(1) and assume there exists a real constant A such that  zt =  xt –
Ayt ~ I(0).  The variable zt then is a measure of short run deviations from the equilibrium (cointegrating)
relationship. It follows that  St = S
t
N=0 zt-N is an I(1) process.  Granger and Lee (1989, 1990) define (xt , yt)
to be multicointegrated if wt = (St - lxt) ~ I(0). Granger and Lee, Haldrup (1998) and Engsted and
Haldrup (1999) proceed to demonstrate that multicointegration can arise from an optimal control problem
with adjustment costs.
 In the current application, zt = Gt + it-1Bt-1 – Rt  is the current period deficit, and we define the
cumulative deficit as Dt =  S
t
j=0 [ Gt-j + it-jBt-j – Rt-j ].  To simplify things, define G*t = Gt + it-1Bt-1 as
government expenditures including interest payments
4.  Intertemporal balance requires that G*t and Rt be
cointegrated with cointegrating vector (-1,1), which in turn implies that nG and nR from equations (4) and
(5) can be represented as
nR, t  =   DWt  +  nR1, t , (7)
nG, t  =   DWt  +  nG1, t , (8)
where Wt is I(1) and nz*1, t are I(-1) processes, Z*=R,G*.  This is the standard common factor
representation for cointegrated series.  In this case, one can think of Wt as a state variable that summarizes
time t economic conditions, and (7) and (8) can be interpreted as the government’s policy response rules. 
Sustainability occurs when the government’s spending and tax revenues depend on information which can
be summarized by the same I(1) information variable.  Changes in government spending and revenues will
then both depend linearly on changes in Wt.
Similarly, Rt and G*t will be multicointegrated if nR and nG can be represented as
                                                                                                                                                  
government spending are constant, i.e. covt( Mt
t+N,Zt+N ) = sMZ,  Z = G,R and " t,N>0.
4 Note that if (xt, yt, zt) are CI(-1,1) with cointegrating vector (-1, a1, a2), then (xt, a1yt + a2zt) will be CI(-  nR, t  =   DWt  +  a1D
2Wt  +  nR2, t , (9)
nG, t  =   DWt  +  a2D
2Wt  +  nG2, t , (10)
where D
2Wt  =  Wt + Wt-2 – 2Wt-1 , nR2, t and nG2, t are I(-2) processes, and a1, a2 satisfy a1 – a2 ¹ 0. 
In this case, Rt and Dt will be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1, – [a1 – a2]
-1).  Equations (9)
and (10) can be thought of as more sophisticated policy response mechanisms in which the
government considers both the change and the rate of change in economic conditions in formulating
its fiscal policy.  This strengthens the equilibrium relationship in a subtle but powerful way—
asymptotically, both the levels and the rates of change of the two series are tied together.  With this
more sophisticated policy response in place, taxes are increased and/or spending is decreased when
the cumulative deficit becomes too large and/or the rate of increase is accelerating.  This can also be
thought of similarly to the production example in Granger and Lee’s (1990) paper. Here the
government faces quadratic adjustment costs for spending and revenues as well as a cost of large
deficits.
In terms of government budgeting behavior, the first cointegration implies that government
spending and revenue flows move together in such a manner as to cause them to share a long-run
equilibrium path.  The second cointegration reflects the fact that when they deviate too far from this
equilibrium path, experiencing deficits and accumulating debt, an additional and separate force leads to
corrective adjustments in one or both series. These relationships reflect the policy response that results
from an optimal control mechanism where adjustment costs are quadratic. In conjunction with restrictions
on parameter estimates outlined below they define our sustainability criteria.
Section 4: Methodology
In  order  to  assess  a  country’s  fiscal  performance  in  terms  of  our  criteria,  standard
                                                                                                                                                  
1,1) with cointegrating bector (-1,1). For consistency with the data we make this simple change of variablescointegration analysis is combined with the multicointegration framework first presented in Granger
and Lee (1989, 1990) and further developed by Engsted, Gonzalo and Haldrup (1997) and Haldrup
(1998).  The multicointegration methodology introduces the possibility of
 polynomial cointegration
and
 deeper long-run relationships, relationships at two different levels between two series.
Given recent work by Zhou (2001) and Gonzalo and Lee (1998) our tests for cointegration
and multicointegration are derived from the single equation approach of Engle and Granger (1987).
Zhou has shown that with small samples (less than fifty observations) of annual data the ADF test of
the cointegration residual is more robust than the lmax and trace statistics utilized in Johansen’s
(1988) procedure. Additionally, Gonzalo and Lee show that the Engle-Granger test is more robust
than Johansen’s LR tests as the LR tests require deeper data analysis than standard unit roots tests.
Consider two series xt and yt.  Typically, it is assumed that they are stationary, in which case
they are integrated of order zero.  In many macroeconomic time series, however, it is more commonly
the case that series are non-stationary and integrated of order one.  In the previous section we have
outlined the conditions under which xt~I(1) and yt~I(1) are found to be (multi)cointegrated. In the
presence of a (multi)cointegrating relationship A(l) will be a super consistent estimate of the
coefficient(s) of (multi)cointegration converging to the true value(s) at a rate of Op(T
-1).
Granger and Lee (1989) have shown that for a bivariate multicointegrated system the error
correction models (ECM) can be represented by
Dxt = -g1zt-1 - g2 wt-1 + lagged (Dxt, Dyt) + e
x
t (11)
Dyt =  -g1zt-1 - g2wt-1 + lagged (Dxt, Dyt) + e
y
t . (11’)
The changes in xt and yt are related to the lagged cointegration errors with the necessary condition
that at least one component of each pair of  g1 and g2  is non-zero. Inclusion of the second error
                                                                                                                                                  
here.correction term,
wt-n, enables the system to be more robust to disturbances. The evidence produced by the ECM
provides information concerning the nature of the short run dynamics necessary for achieving the
long run equilibrium and can be thought of as an additional test of the multicointegration hypothesis.
Further discussion of the vector ECMs is presented in the Technical Appendix.
In terms of our system of interest, if the first cointegrating relation is not (-1,A), where A£1,
yet the economy exhibits a budgeting process that is sustainable, multicointegration should
characterize the system of fiscal variables. The first cointegration captures the long-run equilibrium
relationship between the flow variables while the second cointegration reflects the corresponding
stock-flow relationship. These relationships in combination drive the system of variables to the long
run equilibrium. The disequilibrium errors have a similar interpretation.
We noted in the introduction that multicointegration is a very special form of I(2)
cointegration. While Engle and Yoo (1991) and Johansen (1995), among others, have explored the
more general properties of I(2) systems, until quite recently the multicointegration property and
methodology has not been well developed. Lee (1992), Engsted and Johansen (1997) and Engsted, et.
al (1997) point out that the presence of multicointegration invalidates traditional methods of testing
for cointegration. In the case where the residual from the first cointegration is saved and
 accumulated
to form the St series, thereby producing a generated regressor in the second system, Dickey-Fuller
(DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller
 (ADF) statistics must be further modified to test for the second
cointegration if the Engle-Granger (1987) two step procedure is used.  Similarly, the likelihood ratio
(LR) tests formulated by Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992) require modification when Johansen’s
(1988) procedure is employed.  Moreover, in that the Johansen procedure is founded on the
estimation of a system of error correction models, the misspecification of the ECM in the presence ofmulticointegration is problematic.
Engsted, et. al (1997) present a single-equation procedure for testing multicointegration that
exhibits quite favorable statistical properties. Unlike the procedure proposed by Granger and Lee
(1990) that employs a generated regressor, distributions of test statistics using this single step
approach are well known. It is an extension of the two-step procedure to the case of I(2) variables.
We employ this approach although we also include a modified version of the Engle-Granger two step
procedure.
 5  The approach exploits the fact that multicointegration implies a particular form of I(2)
cointegration. In so doing it simultaneously tests both levels of cointegration.
The initial step requires estimation of the following regression,
    Yt = K0Xt  + K1DXt + d0 + d1td + et, 
(12)
where Yt = åi=1
t yi ~ I(2), Xt = åi=1
t xi ~ I(2), td= trend and DXt could be replaced by DYt. This is
followed by tests of et for the order of cointegration. In that a number of cointegration possibilities
exist, a variety of hypotheses may be relevant for testing. However, in most practical situations I(2)
variables will cointegrate to the I(1) level at least. Therefore, we test the null hypothesis that the I(2)
variables cointegrate to I(1) level, but no further cointegration occurs such that et is I(1). The
distributions of the test statistics depend on the number of I(1) and I(2) regressors, m1  and m2 
respectively. Additionally, deterministic components included in (12) will affect the distributions.
Critical values for various combination of m1 and m2 are presented in Haldrup (1994) for the case
                                                
5 We estimate the first system of spending and revenue variables to generate the estimate of A. We then
subtract revenues from spending to derive the deficit series thereby implicitly imposing the restriction that
A=1. This series is accumulated to form the debt series and the second system of variables is estimated. In
this manner we avoid the genreated regressor problem. For the ADF(L) calculated values for zt and wt
modified critical values are drawn from Engle and Yoo (1987). In order to pick the appropriate lag length of
the calculated values of the ADF statistic for zt, wt and corresponding calculated values for et from equation
(12), two criteria are utilized, Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian (SBC) model selection criteria. On
balance the AIC leads to longer lag structures. Consequently, whenever the criteria indicate differingwith a constant and in Engsted et.al (1997) for trend and quadratic trend cases.
6
In equation (12) the Yt, Xt variables are I(2) by construction while DXt is I(1). In terms of
our system of variables, Y represents accumulated spending, X is the accumulated revenue series and
DX is government revenues. In the presence of multicointegration, K0 is a super-super-consistent
estimate of the first flow equilibrating scalar. Hence, it converges to the true value at a rate of Op(T
-
2). K1 is a super-consistent estimate of the second stock-flow relationship exhibiting Op(T
-1)
convergence. If the policy design is one that is sustainable regardless of economic conditions, K0 and
K1 should be positive.
Positive values of K0 indicate that spending and revenue flows rise together. Because the
environment is stochastic, sustainable budgeting does not impose any a priori restrictions on the
magnitude of K0. It can be greater than, equal to or less than one. If it is less than one, on average
revenues outpace spending leading to the accumulation of surpluses. If it is equal to one, on average
the budget is in balance. In both cases bad economic states are not problematic as there is little, if
any, debt. If K0 is greater than one, on average spending outpaces revenues and the government may
be engaged in a Ponzi gamble requiring tax increases and/or spending cuts in bad states of nature.
Given K0>1, our sustainability criteria requires that government revenues and the present
value of debt be positively related, that is, K1>0. The positive nature of the relationship ensures that
revenues rise (spending declines) to accommodate rising levels of debt. Therefore, regardless of the
behavior of interest rates and growth, government debt will not become burdensome. However, it is
important to note that negative values do not necessarily imply that a country will be intertemporally
                                                                                                                                                  
optimal lags, the shorter lag is chosen.
6 As we note below, should we be unable to accept multicointegration we sequentially test for conventional
cointegration; that is, we test the validity of the null hypothesis. Where we are unable to accept the
hypothesis of I(1) cointegration in conventional tests, the null hypothesis in the tests for multicointegration
is obviously misspecified. Test statistics assuming a null of no cointegration such that et ~ I(2) may beinsolvent. It could be the case that the government has deliberately chosen to exploit low interest
rates relative to rates of growth by running deficits. This is Ball, et. al.’s (1998) Ponzi gamble. Such
a situation will not be problematic unless economic growth collapses.
Finally, we divide our sample into two categories, namely fiscally responsible and
irresponsible countries. Fiscally responsible countries are coded as one; the rest are coded as zero. In
Section 6 we employ logit analysis to determine whether budgeting institutions are important
determinants of the fiscal processes displayed by our sample of countries. Given the dichotomous
nature of the dependent variable, the logit specification is the natural choice for assessing the impact
of a variety of political variables. The endogenous and exogenous variables are related as follows:
P (Y=1½X) = exp (åfkXk) / { 1 + exp (åfkXk)}, (8)
where X is the set of explanatory variables. The sign of fk directly reveals the qualitative impact of
the exogenous variables. In other words, if fk is positive, then the probability of a country being
fiscally responsible increases with xk.
7
Section 5: Multi/cointegration Results
The data utilized in this study are drawn exclusively from OECD Economic Outlook series. They
are annual observations in real domestic currency units from 1960 through 1998 roughly.
 The government
spending series is comprised of expenditures across all levels of government. Similarly, the tax revenue
series  is  an  aggregate  of  government  receipts  from  income  tax,  social  security  tax  or  its  facsimile,
corporate tax and indirect taxes at the various government levels. These series represent consolidated
                                                                                                                                                  
constructed in principle but are not currently available [see Haldrup (1998) for further discussion].
7 A word of caution is in order, for our logit models are certainly under-specified. To be complete we would
need to include several right-hand side variables and capture interaction effects. However, because of the
paucity of our data we are unable to include more than two exogenous variables in each model and no
interactions. Moreover, in order for the logit estimates to be interpretable, the assumptions of no
multicolinearity and no serial correlation must also hold [see Aldrich and Nelson (1984) for discussion].government revenues and expenditures thereby producing a general or consolidated deficit and debt series.
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The series have been adjusted to produce a variety of measures of spending and revenues. In
general all reported test statistics reflect estimations undertaken using real values, real values/GDP and real
values per capita of each series.
 Real values/GDP are real revenue and spending divided by real GDP. The
issues raised by Bohn (1995, 1998) and Ball, et. al. (1998) are framed in terms of this measure. Real
values per capita are real values deflated by population. McCallum (1984) and Easterly (2000) note this
measure may be pertinent as population growth may lead to economic growth and help to service debt.
Graphs of one system of the spending and revenue variables from each country are presented in Figures
1A-15A in the Graphical Appendix.
Table 1 about here
In Table 1 the augmented Dickey Fuller statistics are presented. The statistics test for the presence
of a unit root with and without a trend and allowing for a drift in each series. The various measures of
government spending and revenues generally exhibit unit roots with a trend for all countries. However, for
Finland the real/GDP series are nontrended as are the real series for France. In Norway the revenue series
are nontrended and revenue/GDP is I(0). For the Netherlands real and real/GDP series are both stationary.
In Portugal revenue/GDP is nontrended while spending/GDP is nontrended for the U.S. Finally, for the
U.K. the real series are I(0) as is revenue/GDP.
The next step involves accumulating the appropriate series to produce new series that are I(2) by
construction. This is followed by tests for multicointegration between government spending and receipts.
Results of multicointegration tests and, where appropriate, the corresponding ECMs are presented in Table
                                                
8For the Netherlands the data sample spans 1970-1998. The sample period for Norway is 1962-1998, for France
and the UK it is 1963-1998 and for Spain it is 1964-1998. For the remaining ten countries the sample period is
1960-1998. Base years vary across countries. France and Switzerland have 1980 as the base year; Canada,
Denmark and Spain use 1986; Greece uses 1988; the base year for Belgium, Finland, Italy, the Netherland,
Norway, Portugal and the U.K. is 1990; Sweden and the U.S. employ 1991 and 1992 respectively. Due to
the limitations of the data, interest payments are not separately deflated in the expenditure series.2. Conventional Engle-Granger tests are also executed. Those results are reported in Table 3 with the
ECMs of the cointegrated systems. In Table 4 we summarize our results which include averages of country
growth rates.
Tables 2 and 3 about here
General  inspection  of  Tables  2  and  3  reveals  that  some  support  for  the  multicointegration
hypothesis is evidenced in the fiscal systems of Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K.
and the U.S. For Switzerland and Norway statistical tests of et produce marginal levels of significance and
at least one component of g1 and g2 is not significant in the ECMs. This combination of results leads us to
reject multicointegration for these two countries. However, results in Table 3 generally indicate that both
systems are cointegrated. Additionally, the fiscal systems of Canada, Finland and Spain are cointegrated.
In the remaining five countries no evidence supporting (multi)cointegration is present.
Table 4 about here
In  Table  4  we  have  ranked  the  countries  in  the  order  of  their  performance  with  respect  to
sustainability of their fiscal processes. Our criteria, in order of importance, defines the columns. First
consider Norway, Switzerland, Finland and the U.K. These four countries exhibit fiscal processes that are
sustainable regardless of economic conditions. Evidence from the first two countries suggests that they
have sustained surpluses  throughout  the  sample  period  (A£1).  The  persistence  of  surpluses  could  be
problematic as governments may not allow others to run Ponzi schemes against them. However, in that
government actions do not always arise out of optimizing behavior it is impossible to be certain. Finland
ranks third with respect to our sustainability criteria as results suggest that its fiscal budget has maintained
rough  balance  over  the  sample  period  (A»1).  The  U.K.  is  our  fourth  best  fiscal  performer.
Multicointegration results suggest that although spending has outpaced revenues (K0>1), revenues have
risen as debt has accumulated (K1>0) thereby ensuring that the debt is sustainable in bad economic states.The next six countries evidence cointegration or multicointegration between government spending
and  revenues.  However,  in  the  multicointegrated  systems,  France,  the  U.S.,  Denmark  and  Sweden,
spending has exceeded revenues (Ko>1) and revenues have not risen as debt has accumulated (K1<0). In
the cointegrated systems, Spain and Canada, estimates of the coefficient of cointegration are greater than
one with no corrective mechanisms present.
The remaining five countries produce no evidence supporting the (multi)cointegration hypotheses.
Therefore  we  draw  on  their  growth  rates  and  graphs  of  spending  and  revenues  to  rank  their  fiscal
performance. Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands rank eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth respectively. All
countries display intermittent to persistent deficits moving toward the present and growth rates decline with
rank order. Greece and Italy display large, persistent deficits beginning in the 1970s. Additionally, we find
evidence (not reported) that the deficit series for these two countries is I(1). In that Italian deficits emerged
first and average growth is lower, we rank Italy as the worst country in terms of intertemporal budgeting
and Greece next to last.
These  results  indicate  that  over  the  sample  period  government  spending  and  revenues  are
cointegrated  or  multicointegrated  in  all  countries  except  Belgium,  Greece,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and
Portugal. In other words, the series share a long-run equilibrium relationship in the remaining ten countries.
However, the nature of that relationship varies across countries leading to a variety of implications for
intertemporal sustainability of fiscal policy paths. The results are broadly consistent with those found in the
work of Ahmed (1987), Ahmed  and  Rogers  (1995),  Hakkio  and  Rush  (1991),  Hamilton  and  Flavin
(1986), Haug (1991), Trehan and Walsh (1990), Uctum and Wickens (1996), and von Hagen and Harden
(1994). The relationship of our results for France to those produced by Evans (1987) is, in general,
consistent. Regarding the U.K., all findings are consistent. The Canadian evidence is somewhat consistent
with  that  produced  by  Smith  and  Zin  (1988).  Our  findings  for  the  U.S.  are  inconsistent  with  thoseproduced by Bohn (1998).
With respect to our sustainability criteria, Norway, Switzerland, Finland and the U.K. meet it by
not incurring debt or responding to debt accumulation by raising revenues. For the  remaining  eleven
countries, however, their budgeting practices do not exhibit policy response mechanisms which would
enable the country to mitigate the burdens associated with rising debt. The findings suggest that these
governments have deliberately attempted to exploit low rates of interest relative to growth rates, that is,
engage in a Ponzi gamble, or execute a Ponzi scheme. It is important to note that in our sample of countries
growth rates were zero or negative between 1974 and 1975, in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s
for every country except Norway. This finding is consistent with Ball, et al.’s (1998) finding that the
probability of growth falling below real interest rates is between ten and twenty percent. Thus, for all
countries except Norway, Switzerland, Finland and the U.K., the nature of their fiscal practices may be a
cause for concern.
Finally, evidence produced in the error correction models suggests that in the multicointegrated
systems both revenues and spending adjust to disequilibrium situations. In each ECM where estimates of g1
are significant they are all negative in the equation normalized on spending and positive in the equation
normalized on revenues. This suggests that changes in spending decline and changes in revenue increase in
response to divergences from the flow equilibrium. The magnitude of g1 estimates is generally small,
indicating  rather  slow  speeds  of  adjustment.  Excepting  the  U.K,  with  respect  to  estimates  of  g2  all
significant values are negative indicating that both changes in spending and revenue decline in response to
stock-flow disequilibriums. In every cointegrated system the ECMs support the notion that revenues are
exogenous while government spending declines rather slowly in order to maintain the long run equilibrium
relationship.  This  latter  result  can  be  interpreted  as  consistent  with  Barro’s  (1979)  tax  smoothing
argument.Section 6: The Political Economy of Budget Deficits
To assess the actual institutions for budget making we draw on a variety of recent studies which
have explored the issue, albeit in somewhat different ways and for only partially overlapping cases.  In
Table  5A  we  summarize  the  findings  from  these  various  works.  If  we  combine  the  results  and
indications of these studies of fiscal policy making institutions, it appears that Belgium, Canada,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, have the institutional characteristics least likely
to promote fiscal responsibility. The nature of American and Norwegian institutions fall toward the
middle, while those of Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. appear most
likely to promote adherence to the intertemporal budget constraint.
Table 5 about here
In Table 5B, we have listed the countries in terms of their fiscal policy making institutions,
placing them into three groups, reflecting the findings of these different studies. No rank ordering of
the countries within each group is implied, for the studies do not provide sufficient detail to develop
such a ranking. Adjoining the grouping of countries by the strength and transparency of their fiscal
policy making institutions is the rank order of all countries in our sample based on their adherence to
the  intertemporal  constraint  and  sustainability  criteria.  The  correspondence  is  nearly  perfect.
Countries with weak, nontransparent policy institutions are always among the poorest performers,
those with strong, transparent budgeting institutions among the best. Thus, there is evidence that a
strong, transparent fiscal bureaucracy is associated with responsible budgetary management.
Logit models further confirm this observation. Strong fiscal bureaucracies consistently
appear as good predictors of fiscal responsibility. In a number of logit specifications, presented in
Tables 5C and 5D, the coefficient on our fiscal strength indicator is statistically significant even after
controlling for other politico-institutional variables. Calculations of predicted probabilities from ourmodels indicate that the probability that we would observe a government with a sustainable fiscal
process increases dramatically when the fiscal strength indicator varies from its lowest to highest
value. The predicted probability rises from approximately 0.01 when the fiscal strength indicator is
zero to 0.80 when the fiscal strength indicator assumes a value of three. Even when other politico-
institutional variables are included  this pattern is observed. Thus, the evidence suggests that more
transparent, hierarchical and strong fiscal policy making institutions improve budgeting practices.
Section 7:  Conclusions
In  this  paper  we  develop  a  richer  set  of  criteria  under  the  more  realistic  assumption  that
cov(Mt
t+N,Zt+N) is variable through time for assessing the sustainability of fiscal budgeting practices. We
draw on the work of Granger and Lee (1989, 1990), Bohn (1995), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), Engsted, et.
al. (1997), Ball, et. al. (1998) and Haldrup (1998) to derive a more credible test for sustainability of the
fiscal  budgeting  process  across  all  states  of  nature.  We  show  that  multicointegration  of  government
spending  and  revenue  is  an  appropriate  test  for  the  sustainability  of  the  fiscal  process.  The
multicointegration condition implies that both the levels and rates of change of the series are tied together
over the long run. In the context of our model, they are linked through a sophisticated policy response
mechanism.
We then apply our sustainability criteria to the fiscal systems of fifteen industrialized countries.
Results confirm that intertemporal budgeting strategies vary from country to country and that the strength
and transparency of fiscal institutions are important factors influencing different governments’ approaches
to intertemporal fiscal balance. Finland, Norway, Switzerland and the U.K. have fiscal institutions that are
strong and transparent and they are the four countries that satisfy sustainability criteria. The governments
of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
U.S. exhibit budgeting behavior that is consistent with the accumulation of debt yet inconsistent withcriteria which would enable them to sustain such debts regardless of economic conditions. Specifically, the
governments of these countries either completely lack policy response mechanisms to systematic deficits
and debt accumulation or exhibit policy responses inconsistent with revenue generation and/or spending
reductions aimed at enabling a government to address a large and growing debt. The evidence is consistent
with the notion that they have deliberately engaged in a Ponzi gamble by attempting to exploit low real
interest rates relative to rates of growth or that they are engaged in a Ponzi scheme.Technical Appendix
Johansen’s (1992, 1995) vector error correction model
 (VECM) for a pair of multicointegrated series
is
                                              D
2 Z = P Zt-1 - G D Zt-1 + åi=1
k-2 qiD
2 Zt-i + vt ,
where (Xt,Yt) Ì Zt  is a p dimensional  vector of I(2) time series, G = I - åi=1
k-1 Gi and vt is an error
with a non-singular covariance matrix. Johansen (1995) shows that the parameters satisfy
    P = ab‘, with a, b  p x r, r < p
        a^Gb^ = xh‘, with x, h  (p-r) x s, s < (p-r)                              
where a^ denotes the orthogonal complement of a with dimension p x (p-r) and satisfying a^a=0.
From Paruolo (1996) we let the numbers r, s and p-r-s denote the integration indices of the I(2)
VECM. Allowing for the possibility that first differences of Zt  cointegrate, r relations cointegrate to
the I(0) level. The number of I(1) relations which constitute the I(1) common stochastic trends are
given by s. The number of I(2) relations or I(2) common trends are given by p-r-s.
These three cases are associated with three mutually orthogonal matrices
(b,b1,b2) which provide the basis for the I(0), I(1) and I(2) relations, respectively, such that
r : (b‘Z - db2’DZt) ~ I(0),
s : b1’Zt ~ I(1),
p -r -s : b2’Zt ~ I(2).
For our purposes the I(0) relations are the most interesting. They are expressed in terms of
the linear combinations between the levels of b‘Zt  which are I(1) and the differenced I(2) trends
b2’DZt which are also I(1). It is this special relationship which reflects the polynomially cointegrating
relationship of multicointegration [see  Engsted and Haldrup (1999) for a more complete discussion].
The d matrix is of  r x ( p-r-s) dimension and is defined as d = a‘Gb2 where a = a(a‘a)
-1 and b2 is
similarly defined. Paruolo (1996) and Johansen (1997) discuss the statistical analysis for an I(2)
model in a VAR system.
Paruolo and Rahbek (1996) show that the error correction representation can be given a
more intuitively appealing specification of
D
2Z = a(b’Zt-1 - db2’DZt-1) – (V1,V2)(b,b1)’DZt-1 + åI=1
k-2WiD
2Zt-I + et,    
where  V1=Gb and V2=GB1 are the adjustment parameters. This representation displays the variety of
cointegration possibilities and forms the more general basis for the two error correction models which
are formulated in terms of the original flow variables and the stock and flow variables respectively
[see Engsted and Haldrup (1999) for specification, derivations and proofs].BIBLIOGRAPHY
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U.S.A. ADF(1)*  1.0036  0.8531 -0.8089 -0.3487 -2.3650 -1.5609 ADF(1) -1.7586 -1.8744 -2.7028 -3.5110 -4.2600 -2.9040
____________________
1 Nontrended a = 0.05 critical value is approximately -2.98; trended a = 0.05 critical value is approximately -3.59.
* No trend.TABLE 2
A: Single Equation Multi-cointegration Tests
K0 K1 Con trd ADF DW
Belgium:
               real values
                  real/GDP
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                  real/GDP




















               real values      
            real/GDP
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                  real/GDP
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                  real/GDP
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                  real/GDP
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                  real/GDP




















    
           real per capita
1.1844 0.6284 0.0311 0.0026 -1.1101 0.2497
Norway
               real values
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                 real /GDP
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                  real/GDP
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                  real/GDP




















                real values
                  real/GDP




















          real per capita 1.2764 0.3082 0.0027  0.0009 -5.4799 0.2786
U.S.A.
               real values
                  real/GDP




















1 Based on the equation: Y = K0 X+K1 DX + d0 + d1  trend, where Y = spending ~I(2) and X = revenues
~I(2).
2 Critical values for the ADF statistic of the residuals are drawn from Engsted, et al. (1997).  For n = 25, a =
0.05 value is -4.71, and  a = 0.10 value is -4.30.  For n = 50, a = 0.05 value is = 4.42 and a = 0.10 value is
-4.08.
TABLE 2
B: Multi-Cointegration Error Correction Models
1,2
a           g1        g2           b1           b2 R
2
Denmark
                            DS







    0.2576**







   




0.16                            DR
                            DS
       real  GDP
                            DR
     real
                            DS
     per capita
                            DR
(2.9628)
   0.0057**
(2.3394)
    0.0080**
(2.4080)
    0.0012**
(4.5088)
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    real
                             DR
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     real
    GDP
                             DR  
                   
                             DS
     real per capita









    0.0004**
(2.3969)












   0.2873**
  (2.4031)
  
   -0.0470*
  (-1.7824)
   -0.0272
  (-0.8457)
   -0.2247**
  (-2.6103)
   -0.1272**
  (-2.1585)
   -0.0579*
  (-1.7897)
    -0.1041**









   0.4387**
    (2.5336)
    -0.0711
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     real
                             DR
    
                             DS
 real per capita















   (-2.4218)
     0.1528














   
0.3566**
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     real                   





    -0.0940**
(-2.5286)
     0.1766**
(3.0452)
    -0.0827**
(-4.4625)




     -0.6387**
  (-2.6489)
   -0.2499**
(-2.7482)
     0.5594**
 (3.9424)
0.56
0.40                               DS
     real     GDP          
                               DR
                               DS
 real per capita
                               DR
          
    0.0071**
(2.4735)
    0.0066**
(2.6635)
    0.0029**
(6.4286)
    0.0023**
 (3.2044)
    -0.1279**
(-2.1905)
     0.1082**
    (2.1215)
    -0.0753**
(-2.1278)
     0.1845**
 (3.2592)
    -0.2541**
(-2.9220)
    -0.3038**
(-4.0005)
    -0.1064**
(-5.2239)
   -0.0984**
(-3.0209)
   0.2415
  (1.5289)









      0.5680**
  (3.7189)
    -0.2158**
(-2.5558)
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     real
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     real
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     real
     per capita







   0.0038**
(2.2622)
    0.0002**
(3.8694)
    0.0002**
     (3.8170)






















































U.K.                            
                  
                               DS
     real
     per capita
                               DR
    0.0030**
  (32.8759)
      0.0001**









    2.2347**
   (2.2705)
    0.2350
  (1.2497)
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     real
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     real
     GDP



































     0.3158**
(2.1168)
-0.0000
    (-1.1421)
-0.1270




 -0.08                               DS
     real
     per capita
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   0.3827**
 (2.6538)














1.  Estimated models are based on the equations:
    D Spending = a +  g1  EC1t-1 +  g2EC2t-1 +  b1D Spendingt-1 + b2D Revenuest-1
    D Revenues = a + g1 EC1t-1 + g2 EC2t-1 + b1D Spendingt-1 + b2D Revenuest-1,
       where EC1 is the residual from the first cointegrating relationship (spending and
       revenues) and EC2 is the residual from the second cointegrating relationship
       (revenues and debt).
2.t statistics in parenthesis.
    * indicates  a  =  0.10 significance level.
  ** indicates  a  =  0.05 significance level.Table 3
A:  Engle-Granger (Multi) Cointegration Tests
1,2
a A(l1) DW ADF residual
Belgium            
         real          Spd
                         Rev
real/GDP           Spd
                          Rev
    
real per              Spd
    capita             Rev
 -164734.3























Canada              Spd
  real                  Rev
  real/GDP         Spd
                          Rev
  real per            Spd
     capita            Rev
-12950.2
        155643
         -0.1334
        454953.7
         -0.0008



















Denmark           Spd
 real                   Rev
 real/GDP          Spd
                          Rev
 real per             Spd

























Finland              Spd
 real                   Rev
real/GDP           Spd
                          Rev
real per              Spd

























France               Spd
 real                   Rev
 
 real/GDP          Spd
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-2.1370 real per             Spd









Greece               Spd
 real                   Rev
 real/GDP          Spd
                          Rev
 real per             Spd

























Italy                   Spd
 real                   Rev
 real/GDP          Spd
                          Rev
   
 real per             Spd

























Netherlands     
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Norway              Spd
 real                   Rev
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Portugal             Spd
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 real/GDP          Spd
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  real                  Rev
 real/GDP          Spd
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real per              
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Switzerland       Spd
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 real/GDP          Spd
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 real/GDP          Spd
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1.  Based on the equations: Spending =  a0 + A  Revenues, and
                                              Revenues =  a1 + l1 Debt. 
2.   Due to the small sample size, the critical values for the ADF satistic are drawn from Engle and
Yoo (1987).   For a = 0.05, the critical value is –3.29;  for a = 0.10,  the critical value is –2.90. TABLE 3
B: Error Correction Models
1,2
a g1 b1 b2 R
2
Canada
                  DS
     real
                  DR
                 DS
     real
     GDP
                 DR
                 DS
     real
     per capita




      (4.9191)
-0.0012
(-0.5489)




    0.0002**
(4.0168)












     0.7094**
 (5.8676)



























   -0.08
Finland
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    real
    GDP
                 DR
                 DS
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   0.0017**
(3.1511)
   0.0024**
(3.4613)
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                   DS
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     per capita
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362848.2**
(3.7752)




   0.0059**
(2.6761)
    0.0080**
(3.3596)
   0.0097**
(2.7262)
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     real
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   0.0035**
(1.8473)
   0.0042**
(2.4897)















































1.   Based on DSpending  =  a + g1 EC1t-1 + b1 DSpendingt-1 +  b2DRevenuet-1
                    DRevenue  =  a +  g1 EC1t-1 + b1 DSpendingt-1 +  b2 DRevenuet-1,
     where EC1 is the residual from the cointegrating relationship.
 
2 t statistics in parenthesis.
       *  indicates  a = 0.10 significance level;
     **  indicates  a = 0.05 significance level.TABLE 4
Summary of Results and Rank Ordering of Countries
     (Multi)cointegration Significant ECM
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Revenues >
Spending




9 = (1.06, 1.31,
         1.06)
        




gspd = (-0.13, -.29,





       










K1=(-0.52, -0.0,  
        -0.98)
       





g1,rev = (0.24, 0.29)
g2,spd =(-0.05,-0.22,






       -0.58












       -0.08)
       












       -1.20)
       





            -0.08)
g1,rev = (0.18,0.11,
            0.19)
g2,spd =(-0.08-0.25,
           -0.11)
g2,rev =(-0.08,-0.30,
           -0.10)
                                                
9 Johansen’s C
2 test is unable to reject the (-1,1) hypothesis.Spain Cointegrated
A
10 = (1.07, 1.19, 
       1.09)
      









10 = (1.11, 1.16)
       






grev  = (none)
Portugal No (multi)-
cointegration





























                                                
10 Johansen’s procedure does not find evidence supporting cointegration in the Spanish system. Therefore
we are unable to test the (-1,1) hypothesis. Johansen’s C





























































































Strength and Transparency of fiscal bureaucracy
Fiscal responsibility
a Poor Moderate Strong
  1 Norway
  2  Switzerland
  3 Finland
  4 UK
  5 France
  6 US
  7 Denmark
  8 Sweden







aCountries  are  ranked  from  more  to  less  responsible  in  terms  of  meeting  their  intertemporal  budget
constraint.








































































































                                                
11FiscalResponsibility is coded 1 or 0, reflecting whether government behaves in a fiscally responsible
manner.  Countries coded 1 are Norway, Finland, Switzerland, and UK.  HPI-2 is a composite poverty
measure (UNDP 1998), varying between 0 and 100, with “poorer” countries obtaining higher scores. 
ParlSup and GovDur, measure parliamentary support for government (i.e., the share of parliamentary seats
of a governing coalition) and government stability (average government duration in months since the
1950s).  Data come from Keesing’s (several issues) and the European Journal of Political Research (vols.
22-32).  Cabpower and Legpower measure the average partisanship of cabinets and parliaments from Left (-
1) to Right (1).  Partisanship refers to the economic policy preferences of governing parties.  Data for most
countries come from Garrett 1998.  We computed scores for Greece, Portugal and Spain with information
obtained from Castles and Mair (1984) and Keesing’s (various issues) and following Garrett’s system:
leftist, centrist, and rightist parties are awarded 1, 0 and -1 points respectively.  The points are weighted by
the share of cabinet posts of each party in the coalition (Cabpower) or by the share of legislative seats of
each parliamentary party (Legpower).  Finally, we follow Hahm et al. (1996) in coding FiscalSt as 0, 1, 2 or
3, from weaker to stronger fiscal bureaucracy.  Hahm et al. provide information on Canada, Italy,
Netherlands, UK and US.  We coded France, Greece and Spain based on information from von Hagen and
Harden (1994).  We coded Finland, Norway and Sweden based on information provided by Juhana
Vartiainen, Jonathon Moses, Bo Rothstein and John Stephens, to whom we are grateful.